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Abstract
What do the education premiums look like over the life cycle? What is the
impact of schooling on lifetime earnings? How does the internal rate of return
compare with opportunity cost of funds? To what extent do progressive taxes
attenuate the incentives to invest in education? This paper exploits Norwegian
population panel data with nearly career long earnings histories to answer these
important questions. We provide a detailed picture of the causal relationship
between schooling and earnings over the life cycle, following individuals over
their working lifespan. To account for endogeneity of schooling, we apply three
commonly used identification strategies. Our estimates show that additional
schooling gives higher lifetime earnings and steeper age-earnings profile, in
line with predictions from human capital theory. These estimates imply an
internal rate of return of around 10 percent, after taking into account income
taxes and earnings-related pension entitlements. Under standard conditions,
this finding suggests it was financially profitable to take additional schooling
because the rates of return were substantially higher than the market interest
rates. By comparison, Mincer regressions understate substantially the rates
of return. We explore the reasons for this downward bias, finding that it is
driven by Mincer’s assumptions of no earnings while in school and exogenous
post-schooling employment.
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1 Introduction
Many empirical papers use cross-section data to estimate a Mincer regression of the
following type:
y = µ0 + µ1S + µ2X + µ3X2 + , (1)
where y is log earnings, S is years of schooling, X is (potential) experience and  is
the error term.1 The problem of selection bias can be addressed by controlling for
correlated determinants of earnings or with an instrumental variable for schooling.
However, it is not clear how the coefficient on schooling should be interpreted. One
possibility is to view the Mincer model as a pricing equation for labor market char-
acteristics and interpret µ1 as the growth rate of earnings with schooling (education
premium). A more ambitious interpretation is that µ1 gives the discount rate which
equates the present value of potential income streams for different schooling levels.
This internal rate of return (IRR) is a fundamental economic parameter that is often
used to assess private profitability of additional schooling or whether expenditure on
education should be increased or decreased.
A number of strong assumptions must hold in order to interpret µ1 as the IRR
(see e.g. Heckman et al., 2006, 2008). While many of these assumptions turn out
to hold in the data that Mincer (1974) analyzed, they are now at odds with a large
body of evidence (Heckman et al., 2006). Even interpreting µ1 as an education
premium requires assumptions that no longer receive support in data. In particular,
several studies show that wage patterns have changed substantially over time across
cohorts (see e.g. MaCurdy and Mroz, 1995; Card and Lemieux, 2001). As a result,
cross-sections no longer approximate the life cycle earnings or schooling returns of
any particular individual (Heckman et al., 2006). The use of data that follows actual
cohorts over the life cycle is therefore essential to accurately measure their true
earnings pattern and estimate the education premiums experienced by individuals.
In this paper, we provide a detailed picture of the causal relationship between
schooling and earnings over the life cycle, following individuals over their working
lifespan. There are a number of key questions addressed. What do the education
premiums look like over the life cycle? What is the impact of schooling on lifetime
earnings? How does the IRR compare with the market interest rates typically
observed? To what extent do progressive taxes attenuate the incentives to invest in
education? To investigate these important questions, we exploit a unique source of
1See the review articles by Card (1999), Harmon et al. (2003), Psacharopoulos and Patrinos
(2004), and Heckman et al. (2006).
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population panel data containing records for every Norwegian from 1967 to 2010.
Our analysis focuses on males. To account for endogeneity of schooling, we apply
three identification strategies that are currently in use in the literature: compulsory
schooling reform as an instrument for education; controls for ability test scores; and
within-twin-pair estimation. Our analysis is explicitly ex post, focusing on the actual
returns earned by certain cohorts.2
We begin by estimating education premiums at each age. We find that additional
schooling gives higher lifetime earnings and steeper age-earnings profile, in line with
predictions from human capital theory. The age-specific education premiums imply
an IRR of around 10 percent, after taking into account income taxes and earnings-
related pension entitlements. Under standard conditions, this finding suggests it was
financially profitable to take additional schooling because the rates of return were
substantially higher than the market interest rates typically observed.
Our analysis relaxes many of the strong assumptions that are typical in the
literature.3 Importantly, we can estimate education premiums experienced by indi-
viduals over their life cycle and the corresponding rates of return, without assuming
multiplicative separability between schooling and experience or a stationary envi-
ronment. Our approach also relaxes Mincer’s assumption of no earnings while in
school and exogenous post-schooling employment. Unlike most of the literature, our
estimated rates of return take into account income taxation and earnings-related
pension entitlements.
In the empirical analysis, we expore how the returns to schooling are affected
by incorporating these income components and we compare our estimates of IRR
to those produced by Mincer regressions. We find that accounting for income
taxation reduces the IRR estimates by around 10-15 percent, whereas earnings-related
pention entitlements play a minor role for the incentives to invest in education. Our
estimates also reveal that Mincer regressions understate substantially the rates of
return. When exploring the reasons for this downward bias, our results point to
Mincer’s assumptions of no earnings while in school and exogenous post-schooling
employment.4
2In studies that aim to explain or forecast schooling choices, the distinction between ex ante
and ex post returns to schooling is important (see e.g. Cunha et al., 2005; Heckman et al., 2006;
Cunha and Heckman, 2007). For example, ex post returns govern schooling decisions only if cohorts
anticipate future changes in skill prices.
3Heckman et al. (2006, 2008) examine the role of taxes, tuition and a flexible relationship between
earnings, schooling, and experience in the estimation of IRR. However, these studies assume that
schooling is exogenous and also require a method for extrapolating the earnings function to work
experience levels not observed in the data.
4Positive earnings while in school is common in many countries. For example, data on college
students in the U.S. suggests that many full-time (45 percent) and part-time (83 percent) students
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While there is virtually no pecuniary cost of schooling (such as tuition or fees)
in Norway, we abstract from any psychic costs of education. Psychic costs could
help explaining why not more individuals take additional schooling despite its high
estimated financial return (see e.g. Carneiro et al., 2003; Cunha et al., 2005).
Alternative explanations include credit market constraints (see e.g. Carneiro and
Heckman, 2002; Lochner and Monge-Naranjo, 2011) or uncertainty about future
earnings gains from additional schooling (see e.g. Cunha et al., 2005; Heckman et al.,
2006).
This paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 describes our data, presents the identifi-
cation strategies and reports summary statistics. Section 3 presents the estimated
education premiums and corresponding rates of returns. Section 4 contrasts our
results with estimates from Mincer regressions. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data and empirical strategy
2.1 Data and sample selection
Our empirical analysis uses several registry databases maintained by Statistics
Norway. This allows us to construct a rich longitudinal data set containing records
for every Norwegian from 1967 to 2010. The variables captured in this data set
include individual demographic information (including sex and age), socio-economic
data (such as years of schooling and annual earnings) and ability test scores from
military records. The data set includes personal identifiers, allowing us to link
children to their parents and siblings. We can also merge the longitudinal data set
with census data from 1960. This allows us to measure family background variables,
including childhood municipality of residence.
We consider three measures of income. In each year, our measure of (pre-
tax) earnings is the sum of labor income (from wages and self-employment) and
work-related cash transfers (such as unemployment benefits and short-term sickness
benefits). To take income taxation into account, we use detailed information on the
Norwegian tax system for the period 1967-2010. In each year, we measure after-tax
income by subtracting taxes (on labor income and work-related cash transfers) from
earnings. We also consider a measure of income which takes earnings-related pension
entitlements into account. All Norwegians are entitled to public pension upon
retirement (in accordance with the Norwegian National Insurance Act). The pension
amount depends on an individual’s earnings history from age 16 to retirement. For
were employed during college (NCES, 2013). By comparison, time use surveys from the U.S. suggest
that 14 percent of high school students were employed while in school (Kalenkoski and Pabilonia,
2012). See also Hotz et al. (2002) and Dustmann and Van Soest (2007).
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every income variable, we measure income at a given age as the annual real income
in the corresponding year, adjusted for inflation.5
The Norwegian earnings data have several advantages over those available in
most other countries. First, there is no attrition from the original sample because of
the need to ask permission from individuals to access their tax records. In Norway,
these records are in the public domain. Second, our earnings data pertain to all
individuals, and not only to jobs covered by social security. Third, we have nearly
career-long earnings histories for certain cohorts. And fourth, top-coding is only
performed at very high earnings levels. In fact, less than 3 percent of the observations
have right-censored earnings in any given year.6
Our regressor of interest is the number of years of schooling. To ensure that
virtually everyone has completed their education, we will measure schooling at age
40 throughout this paper. Educational attainment is reported by the educational
establishments directly to Statistics Norway, thereby minimizing any measurement
error due to misreporting.
In the main analysis, we focus on the 1943-1963 cohorts in order to ensure long
earnings histories for all individuals. Our analytical sample is restricted to males
because of low labor market participation rates for women in the early periods.
We exclude immigrants as well as a small number of individuals with missing
information on years of schooling or childhood municipality of residence. Applying
these restrictions provides us with what we will refer to as the full sample, consisting
of 600,679 individuals.
2.2 Education premiums and rates of return
We aim to provide a detailed picture of the relationship between schooling and
earnings over the life cycle, following individuals over their working lifespan. In the
main analysis, we define the potential working lifespan from ages 17 to 62.7 Consider,
for now, the simple earnings regression:
Ya = αa + βaS + εa (2)
where Ya is the annual real earnings at age a = 17, ...., 62, S is years of schooling,
5Throughout the paper, all monetary figures are reported in Norwegian Kroner (NOK), and
adjusted for inflation to 2010 levels (USD/NOK≈6).
6We have also estimated the returns to schooling using a Pareto distribution to simulate earnings
above the top-coded threshold. These estimates are very similar to the baseline results and available
from the authors upon request.
7Although the mandatory retirement age is 67, about 80% of Norwegian workers are entitled to
receive early retirement benefits beginning at age 62 (Hernaes et al., 2013).
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βa is the education premium at age a (which may vary among persons) and εa
is the residual. Equipped with education premiums at every age, we can assess
how additional schooling affects earnings over the life cycle and compute the mean
education premium in lifetime earnings,
β¯ =
62∑
a=17
βa
62− 16 . (3)
The IRR is the discount rate (ρ) that equates the present value of potential
income streams for different schooling levels. The IRR can be defined as the solution
to the following equation:
62∑
a=17
βa
(1 + ρ)a−16 = 0. (4)
Under standard conditions, the IRR can be compared to opportunity cost of funds to
determine if it was financially profitable to take additional schooling. The opportunity
cost is often proxied by the real interest rate in the market (r). The profitability of
investing in education can then be quantified by computing the education premium
in the annuity of lifetime earnings,
β˜ = r˜
62∑
a=17
βa
(1 + r)a−16 (5)
where the constant r˜ = r1−(1+r)−(62−16) . To calculate annuity values, we discount the
earnings streams by a real interest rate of 2.3 percent, which corresponds to the
average real interest rate on deposits and loans in Norway over the period 1967–2010
(Aaberge et al., 2011).
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between life cycle earnings, education premi-
ums and IRR. This figure plots the earnings-age profiles for college and high-school
educated Norwegian men born in the years 1943–1963. For now, suppose schooling
is exogenous and the education premiums are homogenous across individuals. Both
earnings profiles display the familiar concave shape documented and analyzed by
Mincer (1974), but the college-educated workers experience more rapid earnings
growth through most of the life cycle. The college premium at a particular age (βa)
is given by the vertical distance between the earnings profiles. The horizontal lines
depict the mean lifetime real earnings for college and high school educated. The col-
lege premium in mean lifetime earnings (β¯) is given by the vertical distance between
the two horizontal lines. The discount rates that equates the two earnings streams
depends on the extent to which college education gives higher lifetime earnings and
steeper age-earnings profile. In particular, the IRR increases in β¯, holding the slope
8
of βa fixed; and it reduces in the slope of βa, keeping β¯ fixed.
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Figure 1. Life cycle earnings and education premiums
Note: We use the full sample, consisting of the 1943-1963 cohorts of males. We graph annual earnings by age and
mean lifetime earnings for males with high school diploma (but no post-secondary education) and males with college
degree. The college premium at a particular age βa is given by the vertical difference between the earnings profiles.
The difference between the horizontal lines gives the college premium in mean lifetime earnings, β¯.
For simplicity, we described here the method for determining the IRR with no
income taxation or earnings-related pension. In the empirical analysis, we explore
how the results are affected by incorporating these income components and we
compare our estimates of IRR to those produced by Mincer regressions.
2.3 Identification strategies
In the absence of experimental evidence, it is difficult to know whether the higher
earnings observed among highly educated workers are caused by their additional
schooling, or whether individuals with greater earnings capacity have chosen to
acquire more schooling. To address this concern for selection bias in earnings
regressions, a number of identification strategies have been proposed. In this paper,
we apply three different identification strategies that are currently in use in the
literature.
Instrumental variable approach Our first identification strategy is an instrumental
variable (IV) approach that follows Black et al. (2005) in using the staged imple-
9
mentation of a Norwegian compulsory schooling law reform as a source of exogenous
variation in educational attainment.8
The reform increased compulsory schooling from seven to nine years, and was
implemented between 1959 and 1974 in different municipalities (the lowest level of
local administration) at different times. Thus, for more than a decade, Norwegian
schools were divided into two separate systems, where the length of compulsory
schooling depended on the year in which an individual was born and the municipality
of residence. From public records, we are able to successfully identify the year in
which the reform was implemented for as many as 672 of the 732 municipalities.
Individuals who were residing in a municipality to which we could not assign a reform
indicator are dropped from our sample. Applying this sample restriction we get
an IV sample consisting of 576,704 individuals who were born during the period
1943-1963, covering nearly 96 percent of the full sample. As shown in Appendix
Table A.1, there is considerable variation in exposure to the compulsory schooling
reform, both across cohorts and municipalities. In particular, nobody born before
1946 was subject to nine years of compulsory schooling, whereas all individuals born
after 1960 were affected by the new law.
The IV model is given by the following two-equation system, where (7) is the
first stage and (6) is the second stage:
Ya = αa + βaS + µca + µma + ea (6)
S = γ0 + γ1Z + θc + θm + u (7)
where Z is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the individual was exposed to
the reformed schooling law and 0 otherwise, subscript m denotes municipality and
subscript c denotes birth cohort.9 Unobservable determinants of earnings or schooling
that are fixed at the municipality level will be controlled for through the childhood
municipality indicators (µma, θm), just like the birth cohort indicators (µca, θc) absorb
changes in cohort quality or aggregate changes in skill prices. Throughout the
8We refer to Black et al. (2005) for details about the reform. Other studies that have used
this reform include Monstad et al. (2008), Aakvik et al. (2010), and Machin et al. (2012). For
evidence on how compulsory schooling laws have affected earnings in other countries, see e.g.
Angrist and Krueger (1991) and Oreopolous (2006) for the United States, Harmon and Walker
(1995), Oreopolous (2006), Devereux and Hart (2010), and Devereux and Fan (2011) for the United
Kingdom, Meghir and Palme (2005) for Sweden, and Oreopolous (2006) for Canada and Northern
Ireland. None of these studies estimate education premiums experienced by individuals over their
life cycle and the corresponding internal rates of return.
9Equation (6) specifies a linear relationship between the conditional expectation of earnings Ya
and years of schooling S. Figure A.1 shows predictions from a local linear regression of schooling
on average lifetime earnings. The results suggest that a linear specification provides a fairly good
approximation of the underlying earnings-schooling relationship.
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paper, standard errors are always clustered at the municipality level and robust to
heteroskedasticity.
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Figure 2. Graphical illustration of the IV approach
Note: For each municipality, we recenter the data such that time zero is the year in which the reform was implemented.
Variables are residuals from a regression on birth cohort and municipality fixed effects (adding in a common intercept).
We restrict the IV sample to individuals from 660 municipalities (of 672) for which we can construct a balanced
sample of 4 years around 0.
Figure 2 provides a visual representation of our IV approach, after taking out
municipality and cohort effects. For each municipality, time zero represents the first
birth cohort affected by the compulsory schooling law reform. The y-axis on the
right (left) side of the graph shows the change in compulsory schooling law from
time -1 to time 0 is associated with a substantial increase in educational attainment
(lifetime earnings). The graph suggests a sizable IV estimate on lifetime earnings of
the reform-induced increase in schooling.10
In Section 3.3, we challenge the validity of the instrument by probing the stability
of the IV estimates to alternative specifications, finding little cause for worry.
Alternative strategies The IV model identifies the education premiums among
persons obliged to stay in school longer because of compulsory school laws. Because
10Estimation results from equation (7) show a strong first stage with an estimated coefficient on
the instrument of 0.213. This means that exposure to the compulsory schooling reform increased
years of schooling by about one-fifth of a year. The F-statistic for the instrument is around 93,
implying that weak instrument bias is not a concern for our analysis.
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of the local nature of these estimates, we will also apply two alternative identification
strategies that are currently in use in the literature.11
Rather than using an instrument, our second strategy attempts to control directly
for differences in ability when estimating equation (6). To this end, we use information
on ability test scores from Norwegian military records. In Norway, military service
is compulsory for all able males. Before entering the service, their medical and
psychological suitability is assessed; this occurs for the great majority around their
18th birthday. The ability test scores are only available for cohorts born in 1950 or
later. Our ability sample therefore consists of 325,233 individuals who were born
during the period 1950-1963. This amounts to about 81.3% of the full sample.
The ability measure is a composite score from three speeded tests – arithmetics,
word similarities, and figures.12 The composite test score is an unweighted mean of
the three scores. The score is reported in stanine (Standard Nine) units, a method of
standardizing raw scores into a nine-point standard scale with a normal distribution,
a mean of 5, and a standard deviation of 2. We add a full set of test score indicators
to equation (6).
Our final strategy is to use within-twin-pair estimation of equation (6). This
strategy identifies the education premiums by comparing the difference in schooling
of the twins in a pair with the difference in their earnings (see e.g. Griliches, 1979;
Ashenfelter and Krueger, 1994). The idea is that twins share genetics and the same
family background environment, possibly reducing the extent of selection bias.13
Our twins sample consists of 6,490 individuals, which is about 1.1% of the full
sample. Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to distinguish between monozygotic
and dizygotic twins. This means that our within-twin-pair estimates might be
confounded by unobserved heterogeneity in genetics. As we only consider male twin
pairs, we know from Weinberg’s rule that about half of the males in the twins sample
are monozygotic.
11Carneiro et al. (2011) show substantial population heterogeneity in the impact to college, raising
concerns about the external validity of IV estimates of returns to schooling.
12The arithmetic test mirrors the test in the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS); the word
test is similar to the vocabulary test in WAIS; and the figures test is comparable to the Raven
Progressive Matrix test. See Sundet et al. (2004, 2005) and Thrane (1977) for details.
13Although much used, within-twin-pair estimation has been criticized. First, there could be
other differences between the twins that are unobservable to the researcher and that affect both
the schooling decision and earnings. Second, within-pair estimates are likely to suffer from greater
attenuation bias (see e.g. Bound and Solon, 1999; Isacsson, 2004). We reduce the problem of
measurement error by using administrative data on earnings and education attainment rather than
self-reported surveys.
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2.4 Descriptive statistics
Before turning to the estimation of the education premiums, we describe a few
important features of our data.
We study the 1943-1963 cohorts during the period 1967-2010. This selection of
cohorts provides up to 44 consecutive observations of individual earnings. However,
our baseline model estimates age-specific education premiums from age 17 to 62 – a
total of 46 years. As a result, our baseline estimates are based on an unbalanced
panel of earnings. For the cohort born in 1949, we observe earnings between the ages
of 18 and 62. For the cohorts born earlier (1943-1948), we miss one or more earnings
observation between the ages of 17 and 23. For the cohorts born later (1953-1963),
earnings are no longer observed at some point over the ages 48-62.
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Figure 3. The size of each estimation sample over ages 17-62
Note: The IQ sample consists of individuals born during the period 1950-1963, while the other samples consist of
cohorts born between 1943 and 1963. The graphs show the total number of observations over the ages 17-62, the
attrition due to death and out-migration, and the size of each estimation sample.
Figure 3 shows the size of each sample by age. Over most of the working
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lifespan, these samples change little. However, the number of observations decrease
significantly late (early) in the working lifespan because we are not observing the
earnings of younger (older) cohorts at these ages. It is therefore reassuring to find
that both the earnings profiles (cf. Figure 1) and the education premiums (cf. Figure
4) display smooth shapes over the life cycle. Nevertheless, we provide a sensitivity
analysis in Section 3.3, showing that our results are robust to restricting the sample
to ages at which we have a balanced panel. Figure 3 also highlight that there is little
attrition to the samples due to death and out-migration. As a result, our estimates
barely move depending on the assumptions we make about the missing earnings of
these individuals (see Section 3.3).
Table 1 reports summary statistics for key variables in our analysis. In Panel A,
we present means and standard deviations for earnings or pension income over ages
17-24, 25- 44, 45-62, and 63-85. Panel B reports means and standard deviations for
years of schooling. The increase in mean earnings over the life cycle is accompanied
by an increase in the variance of earnings, in line with the fanning out of the earnings
profiles by education levels.
Table 1. Summary statistics
Full sample IV sample IQ sample Twins sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. earnings and pension income
Mean earnings, age 17 - 24 112 367.4 112 608.7 112 888.7 112 290.8
(67 120.0) (67 177.5) (60 334.5) (63 910.3))
Mean earnings, age 25 - 44 295 749.6 296 493.3 320 435.0 292 040.0
(156 622.4) (157 591.9) (173 176.8) (132 507.2)
Mean earnings, age 45 - 62 402 068.9 402 853.4 456 179.9 399 774.8
(329 919.9) (332 217.6) (332 212.4) (297 671.5)
Mean pensions, age 63 - 85 274 430.7 275 021.8 297 149.3 276 606.6
(93 427.6) (93 470.1) (89 887.3) (91 483.9)
Panel B. Educational attainment
Years of schooling 11.68 11.68 12.03 11.50
(2.83) (2.83) (2.61) (2.74)
Number of observations 600,679 576,512 325,231 6,490
Note: For each sample, panel A displays average annual earnings and pension income over different age intervals,
whereas panel B reports average years of schooling. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
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3 Education premiums and rates of return
3.1 The earnings-schooling relationship
Figure 4 displays OLS estimates of the education premium in earnings at every age.
The estimated effects of schooling increase over most of the life cycle. The estimates
start out negative when these men are young, reflecting that some individuals taking
higher education are still in school, and that low-educated workers have considerably
more work experience early in their careers. The education premiums rise quickly
until individuals are in their late 40s. Equipped with education premiums at each
age, we compute the corresponding IRR from equation (4). The first column of
panel A in Table 2 reports the OLS estimate of IRR in earnings with standard errors
computed from non-parametric bootstrap.14 This estimate suggests that a discount
rate of 14 percent is necessary to equate the present value of earnings streams across
schooling levels.
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Figure 4. OLS estimates of age-specific education premiums
Note: This figure graphs OLS estimates of the age-specific education premiums for the full sample. All regressions
include fixed effects for childhood municipality and birth cohort. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and
clustered at the municipality level. The 95% confidence intervals are drawn in shaded areas.
The other columns of panel A show IRR estimates when addressing the concern
for selection bias. In every case, we compute the IRR from a full set of age-specific
14We use 250 bootstrap replications. Throughout the paper, in each iteration of the bootstrap
we re-estimate the education premiums so that the standard errors account for the fact that βˆa is
itself an estimated object.
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education premiums. Panel B summarizes how these education premiums vary across
the life cycle by estimating the effect of schooling on average earnings over different
age intervals. Panel C displays the education premium in lifetime earnings. This
panel also reports the impact of schooling on the annuity value of the sum of earnings,
discounted by the market interest rates. All estimates in panels B and C are reported
in Norwegian Kroner (NOK), while the estimated effects relative to the dependent
means are reported in squared brackets.
Table 2. Education premiums and internal rates of return
Full sample IV sample IQ sample Twins sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV IQ control Twin FE
Panel A. Internal rate of return
Internal rate of return 0.140*** 0.105** 0.122*** 0.117***
(0.001) (0.048) (0.001) (0.011)
Panel B. Education premiums over the life-cycle
Mean earnings, ages 17 – 24 -9073.5*** -5097.8*** -8736.4*** -6344.5***
(270.8) (1826.4) (165.4) (405.1)
[-0.081] [-0.045] [-0.077] [-0.056]
Mean earnings, ages 25 – 44 15493.5*** 5918.1* 11571.2*** 7583.5***
(288.1) (3285.7) (229.2) (942.8)
[0.051] [0.021] [0.036] [0.026]
Mean earnings, ages 45 – 62 38285.2*** 10186.4 32409.4*** 23745.1***
(987.2) (6967.1) (937.9) (2329.1)
[0.090] [0.025] [0.068] [0.056]
Panel C. Lifetime education premiums
Mean lifetime earnings 18636.1*** 7114.1** 12936.2*** 10534.5***
(416.4) (3382.5) (333.5) (1023.1)
[0.063] [0.024] [0.042] [0.036]
Annuity lifetime earnings 9266.1*** 4123.2** 6143.3*** 5014.5***
(195.3) (1881.1) (156.9) (565.9)
[0.052] [0.024] [0.032] [0.029]
N 600,679 325,231 6,490 576,512
Note: For each identification strategy, we report estimates of IRR (Panel A), education premiums in average earnings
over different age intervals (Panel B), and education premiums in mean lifetime earnings and annuity lifetime
earnings (Panel C). All regressions include fixed effects for childhood municipality and birth cohort. Standard errors
of the education premiums are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the municipality level. The standard errors
of the IRR are computed by non-parametric bootstrap with 250 replications. All earnings estimates are reported in
Norwegian Kroner (NOK), while the estimated effect relative to the dependent mean is reported in squared brackets.
* p < 0.10, ** < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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There are clear patterns in our results, independent of identification strategy.
Additional schooling gives higher lifetime earnings and steeper age-earnings profiles.
Taken together, the age-specific education premiums give IRR estimates which are
substantially higher than the market interest rates typically observed. This finding
is mirrored in the positive and significant effects of schooling on the annuity lifetime
earnings. However, the estimated education premiums in lifetime earnings tend to be
even higher because most of the earnings gains to schooling arise late in the working
life and are discounted heavily in the annuity calculations. For example, the OLS
estimates imply that an additional year of schooling increases lifetime earnings by
6.3 percent (NOK 18,631) while annuity lifetime earnings increases by 5.2 percent
(NOK 9,266).
There are, however, some noticeable differences in the results across the identifica-
tion strategies. These differences are unlikely to be due to the discrepancies in sample
selection, as the OLS estimates are very similar across the samples.15 In particular,
addressing the concern for selection bias decreases the OLS estimates of both the
education premiums and the IRR. A common interpretation of this finding is that
individuals with greater earnings capacity have chosen to acquire more schooling.
3.2 Accounting for taxes and pension entitlements
Like most studies of the returns to schooling, the estimates in Table 2 are based on
pre-tax earnings. Since tuition costs are negligible in Norway, proportional taxes
on earnings would have no effect on estimated IRR as they reduce earnings by the
same proportion regardless of educational choices (Heckman et al., 1998, 2008). For
the same reason, ignoring earnings-related pension entitlement would not affect the
IRR estimates if pension income was proportional to lifetime earnings. However,
the progressive nature of the Norwegian tax and pension system may attenuate the
incentives to invest in education.
In the first and second row of Table 3, we report IRR estimates based on pre-tax
earnings and after-tax income, respectively. As in most OECD countries, the tax
system in Norway is progressive through deductions and surtaxes.16 Comparing the
estimates, we find that accounting for income taxation reduces the IRR estimates by
around 10-15 percent. To understand how taxes affect the incentives to invest in
education, Figure 5 presents OLS estimates of the education premium in after-tax
income over the life cycle in Figure 5. We can see that progressive taxes not only
15The results are available from the authors upon request.
16Appendix, Section A.2, describes the tax system in more detail and presents marginal and
average tax rates on labor income in different years.
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reduces the education premium in lifetime income but also attenuate the slope of
the age-specific education premiums.
Table 3. IRR estimates accounting for taxes and pension income
Full sample IV sample IQ sample Twins sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV IQ control Twin FE
Pre-tax earnings 0.140*** 0.105** 0.122*** 0.117***
(0.001) (0.048) (0.001) (0.011)
After-tax income 0.118*** 0.094** 0.109*** 0.106***
(0.001) (0.045) (0.001) (0.010)
After-tax income 0.119*** 0.095** 0.110*** 0.107***
+ pension income (0.001) (0.045) (0.001) (0.010)
N 600,679 576,512 325,231 6,490
Note: For each identification strategy, we report estimates of IRR in pre-tax earnings, after-tax income, and after-
tax income + pension entitlements. All regressions include fixed effects for childhood municipality and birth cohort.
The standard errors are computed by non-parametric bootstrap with 250 replications.
* p < 0.10, ** < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Figure 5. OLS estimates of education premiums in pre-tax earnings and after-tax
income
Note: This figure graphs OLS estimates of the age-specific education premiums in pre-tax earnings and after-tax
income for the full sample. All regressions include fixed effects for childhood municipality and birth cohort. Standard
errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the municipality level. Shaded areas show 95% CIs.
In the third row of Table 3, we report IRR estimates based on a measure of after-
tax income that includes future earnings-related pension entitlements. We calculate
after-tax pension entitlements based on individuals’ earnings histories, assuming that
each individual retires after age 62 and dies at age 85; these assumptions match the
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typical retirement age and life expectancy of the cohorts born between 1943 and
1963 (Brunborg et al., 2008). We find that the IRR estimates barely move when we
account for pensions, irrespective of the identification strategy we employ. This is
largely because pension income is received at older ages. As a result, it is discounted
heavily in the computation of the IRR. This suggests that earnings-related pension
entitlements play a minor role for the incentives to invest in education.
3.3 Sensitivity analysis
IV strategy An important requirement for our IV approach to be valid is that
the timing of the reform implementation is unrelated to different underlying cohort
trends in earnings across municipalities. We begin by investigating the relationship
between the timing of the reform and baseline municipality characteristics. To this
end, we estimate the following equation
Tmt = (Γt ×Bm,1960)′ψt + τm + τt + χmt (8)
where Tmt is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if municipality m implemented
the reform by year t (and 0 otherwise), and Bm,1960 is a vector with municipality-
level information from year 1960 on demographic, socio-economic and political
characteristics. By interacting these variables with a vector of time-dummies Γt, we
can estimate whether the timing of the reform is correlated with observed municipality
characteristics. Appendix Figure A.2 plots the estimated coefficients from the vector
of coefficients ψt for each year t (and the associated 95% confidence intervals). We
find no evidence of a systematic relationship between the timing of the reform
implementation and baseline municipality characteristics.
To further increase the confidence in our IV estimates, we consider two ways
to allow for differential cohort trends across municipalities. First, we estimate
municipality-specific cohort trends over the pre-reform period based on birth cohorts
born 1930-1960. For each municipality, we obtain estimates of linear and quadratic
cohort trends in earnings and years of schooling. We then add controls for these
cohort trends in both the first and second stage of the IV model. Columns 2 and 3 of
Table 4 show that the IRR estimates remain sizable after controlling for pre-reform
cohort trends. Second, we include interactions between each municipality-level
characteristic and linear or quadratic cohort trends. In doing so, we allow the
reform implementation to be related to different underlying cohort trends across
municipalities, depending on their pre-reform characteristics. Columns (4) and (5)
of Table 4 support the conclusion that it was financially profitable to take additional
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schooling because the IRR is substantially higher than the market interest rates.
Table 4. Robustness of IV estimates
Baseline Pre-reform trend Interacted trend
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic
Panel A. IV estimates
Internal rate of return 0.105** 0.099** 0.080* 0.074* 0.116***
(0.048) (0.046) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043)
Panel B. First stage estimates
Coefficient 0.213*** 0.215*** 0.216*** 0.214*** 0.220***
(0.022) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017)
F-value (instrument) 92.76 119.32 133.41 146.18 164.97
N 576,512 576,512 576,512 576,512 576,512
Note: Column (1) repeats the baseline results, while columns (2) and (3) include controls for linear and quadratic
cohort trends for each municipality and columns (4) and (5) also add interactions between linear and quadratic
cohort trends and the baseline municipality characteristics (measured in 1960) that are listed in Figure A.2. All
regressions include fixed effects for childhood municipality and birth cohort. The standard errors of the IRRs (Panel
A) are computed by non-parametric bootstrap with 250 replications. Standard errors of the first-stage estimates
(Panel B) are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the municipality level.
* p < 0.10, ** < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Sensitivity to unbalanced panel So far, our analysis has been based on data for the
1943-1963 cohorts during the period 1967-2010. This selection of cohorts provides up
to 44 consecutive observations of individual earnings. However, our baseline model
estimates age-specific education premiums from age 17 to 62 – a total of 46 years.
As a result, our baseline estimates are based on an unbalanced panel of earnings.
It is therefore reassuring to find that both the earnings profiles (cf. Figure 1) and
the education premiums (cf. Figure 4) display smooth shapes over the life cycle.
Nevertheless, Table 5 provides a sensitivity analysis, showing that our results are
robust to restricting the sample to ages at which we have a balanced panel. In
particular, the second row presents IRR estimates based on complete records of
earnings from age 17 to 50 for the cohorts 1950-1960. By comparing these estimates
to those reported in the first row, it is clear that our findings are robust to restricting
the IRR calculation to education premiums over ages 17-50.
In Table 5, we also show that our IRR estimates change little depending on the
assumptions we make about the missing earnings of individuals who die or migrate.
In the third row, we keep these individuals in our estimation sample by assigning
zero earnings to ages at which their earnings observations are missing. In the fourth
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column, we replace the missing earnings observations with an individual’s average
earnings over the past five years prior to death or migration. In either case, the IRR
estimates are quite similar to the baseline results.
Table 5. Sensitivity of IRR estimates to an unbalanced panel
Full sample IV sample IQ sample Twins sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV IQ control Twin FE
Unbalanced panel: 0.140*** 0.105** 0.122*** 0.117***
use cohorts 1943-1963 (0.001) (0.048) (0.001) (0.011)
Balanced panel: 0.137*** 0.135** 0.108*** 0.109***
use cohorts 1950-1960 (0.001) (0.058) (0.001) (0.018)
No sample attrition: 0.145*** 0.131*** 0.129*** 0.126***
assign 0 earnings (0.001) (0.050) (0.001) (0.012)
No sample attrition: 0.143*** 0.120*** 0.126*** 0.123***
assign past earnings (0.001) (0.046) (0.001) (0.011)
Note: The first row repeats the baseline results; the second row restricts the IRR calculation to education premiums
over the ages 17-50 for the cohorts 1950-1960; the third row keep individuals who die or migrate in our estimation
sample by assigning zero earnings to ages at which their earnings observations are missing; the fourth column
replaces the missing earnings observations with an individual’s average earnings over the past five years prior to
death or migration. All regressions include fixed effects for childhood municipality and birth cohort. The standard
errors are computed by non-parametric bootstrap with 250 replications.
* p < 0.10, ** < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
4 Comparison with Mincer regressions
Mincer regressions are widely used to estimate the IRR. As discussed in Heckman et al.
(2006), this approach recovers the IRR only under a number of strong assumptions.
Our exceptionally rich data allows us to relax some of these assumptions and to
assess the extent to which they create bias in Mincer regressions.
We begin by using cross-section data to estimate the Mincer regression given in
equation (1). Figure 6 reports OLS estimates of the coefficient on years of schooling
for each cross-section over the period 1980–2010. These estimates are considerably
lower than the IRR we obtained from our estimates of education premiums at every
age. This holds true both when we consider all males aged 16-72 in a given year and
when we restrict the estimation sample to include the same set of cohorts in the two
analyses (i.e. the 1943-1963 cohorts). The increasing pattern over time points to a
non-stationarity environment, either due to cohort or calender time effects.
In Table 6, we explore the relative importance of several key assumptions behind
the Mincer regression. For brevity, we focus on year 2005. The first row of Panel
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A considers males aged 16-72. Independent of identification strategy, the results
suggest a significant downward bias in the IRR estimates from the Mincer model.17
In the second row of Panel A, we restrict the sample to the 1943-1963 cohorts. While
the IRR estimates increase significantly, they remain substantially lower than our
baseline results.
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Figure 6. Comparison of OLS estimates of returns to schooling
Note: The horizontal line displays our baseline OLS estimate of IRR in pre-tax earnings, which is computed from
age-specific education premiums over the life-cycle of the 1943-1963 cohorts. The Mincer regressions use cross-
section data on males with non-zero earnings. In each cross-section over the period 1980-2010, we regress log
pre-tax earnings on years of schooling, experience and experience squared. The solid line represents estimates
for individuals aged 16-72 in a given year, whereas the stippled line represents estimates for which the sample is
restricted to the 1943-1963 cohorts. Shaded areas show 95% confidence intervals.
A possible explanation for the downward bias in the IRR estimates is that the
Mincer model assumes a stationary environment. This assumption allows researchers
to use cross-section experience–earnings profiles as guides to the life cycle earnings
of persons. However, recent evidence suggests that wage patterns have changed
substantially over time or across cohorts (see e.g. MaCurdy and Mroz, 1995; Card
and Lemieux, 2001), raising doubts about the stationarity assumption. The third row
of Panel A pools the cross-sectional data sets over the period 1980-2010. This allows
us to include a full set of indicator variables for calender time effects, absorbing
aggregate changes in skill prices over time. By doing so, the estimates from the
Mincer are significantly reduced, creating an even larger discrapency to our baseline
IRR estimates.
17Table 6 does not report IV estimates because the compulsory schooling instrument does not
allow us to identify the coefficient on years of schooling in the Mincer regression.
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Table 6. Comparison of returns to schooling estimates
OLS IQ control Twin FE
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Internal rate of return based on mincer regressions
Cross section data, 2005: 0.077*** 0.072*** 0.052***
Individuals aged 17 - 62 (0.001) (0.002) (0.005)
N 1,208,601 902,933 21,420
Cross section data, 2005: 0.097*** 0.083*** 0.071***
Cohorts born 1943-1963 (0.001) (0.001) (0.007)
N 550,089 306,720 6,026
Pooled cross-sections, 1980-2010: 0.072*** 0.068*** 0.054***
Cohorts born 1943-1963 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
N 550,089 306,720 6,026
Panel B. Internal rate of return based on age-specific education premiums
Baseline estimate: 0.140*** 0.122*** 0.117***
Cohorts born 1943-1963 (0.001) (0.001) (0.011)
N 600,679 325,231 6,490
Assign zero earnings while in school: 0.107*** 0.083*** 0.074***
Cohorts born 1943-1963 (0.001) (0.001) (0.007)
N 600,679 325,231 6,490
Drop obs. with zero earnings in 2005: 0.116*** 0.107*** 0.084***
Cohorts born 1943-1963 (0.001) (0.001) (0.013)
N 550,089 306,720 6,026
Note: Panel A reports estimates from Mincer regressions using data on males with non-zero earnings. In each row,
we regress log pre-tax earnings on years of schooling, experience and experience squared. We report estimates for
the schooling coefficient. The first row uses data for individuals aged 16-72 in 2005, while the second row restricts
this sample to the 1943-1963 cohorts. The third row pools cross-section data over the period 1980-2010 for the
1943-1963 cohorts. Panel B reports estimates of IRR in pre-tax earnings, which is computed from age-specific
education premiums over the life-cycle of males from the 1943-1963 cohorts. The first row reports our baseline
estimates, the second row assigns zero earnings to individuals while in school, and the third row drops observations
with zero earnings in 2005. All regressions include fixed effects for childhood municipality. Standard errors in Panel
A are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the municipality level. Standard errors in Panel B are computed
by non-parametric bootstrap with 250 replications.
* p < 0.10, ** < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
In Panel B of Table 6, we explore two alternative explanations. We first examine
the importance of Mincer’s assumption of no earnings while in school. In the absence
of tuition, this assumption implies that the costs of an additional year of schooling
is equal to an individual’s total earnings capacity. However, many high school
and college students actually have non-zero earnings while in school (NCES, 2013;
Kalenkoski and Pabilonia, 2012), which should generate a downward bias in the
estimates from the Mincer regression. In the second row of Panel B, we assign
zero earnings to individuals while they are in school and re-estimate the education
premiums at every age. Equipped with the new education premiums at each age, we
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compute the corresponding IRR from equation (4). We find that earnings while in
school account for much of the discrapency between our baseline IRR estimates and
those produced by the Mincer regression. This finding is consistent with the fact
that earnings accumulated early in life receive a lot of weight in the IRR calculations.
The other explanation we explore is that education affects employment and
therefore creates an endogenous sample selection in the Mincer regressions of log
earnings on schooling and experience. This would create downward bias in the
estimated rates of return from the Mincer model, insofar additional schooling increases
the employment rate of individuals with low potential earnings. In the third row
of Panel B, we drop individuals with zero earnings in 2005 and re-estimate the
education premiums at every age. Equipped with the new education premiums at
each age, we compute the corresponding IRR from equation (4). Our results suggest
the assumption of exogenous employment leads to significant downward bias in the
IRR estimates.
5 Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to provide a detailed picture of the causal relationship
between schooling and earnings over the life cycle, following individuals across their
working lifespan. We addressed a number of key questions: What do the education
premiums look like over the life cycle? What is the impact of schooling on lifetime
earnings? How does the IRR compare with the market interest rates typically
observed? To what extent does progressive taxes attenuate the rates of return to
schooling? To investigate these important questions, we exploited a unique source of
population panel data containing records for every Norwegian male from 1967 to 2010.
To account for endogeneity of schooling, we applied three identification strategies
that are currently in use in the literature: (i) compulsory schooling reform as an
instrument for schooling, (ii) controls for ability test scores, and (iii) within-twin-pair
estimation. The analysis was explicitly ex post and focused on identifying the actual
returns earned by certain cohorts over their life cycle.
We started our analysis by estimating education premiums at each age. The
findings revealed that additional schooling gives higher lifetime earnings and steeper
age-earnings profile, in line with predictions from human capital theory. The age-
specific education premiums implied an IRR of around 10 percent, after taking
into account income taxes, earnings-related pension entitlements and tuition costs.
Under standard conditions, this finding suggests it was financially profitable to take
additional schooling because the rate of return is substantially higher than the market
24
interest rates typically observed.
Our analysis relaxed many of the strong assumptions that are typical in the
literature.18 Importantly, we estimated education premiums experienced by individ-
uals over their life cycle and the corresponding rates of return, without assuming
multiplicative separability between schooling and experience or a stationary envi-
ronment. Our approach also relaxed Mincer’s assumption of no earnings while in
school and exogenous post-schooling employment. Unlike most of the literature, our
estimated rates of return accounted for income taxation and earnings-related pension
entitlements.
In the empirical analysis, we expored how the returns to schooling are affected
by incorporating these income components and we compare our estimates of IRR to
those produced by Mincer regressions. We found that accounting for income taxation
reduces the IRR estimates by around 10-15 percent, whereas earnings-related pention
entitlements play a minor role for the incentives to invest in education. Our estimates
also revealed that Mincer regressions understate substantially the rates of return.
When we explored the reasons for this downward bias, our results point to Mincer’s
assumptions of no earnings while in school and exogenous post-schooling employment.
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A Appendix
A.1 Figures and tables
Table A.1. Implementation of reform across cohorts 1943-1963
All Treated Non-treated
Cohort: (% of all) (% of all)
1943 23,149 0 (0.00) 23,149 (100.00)
1944 26,319 0 (0.00) 26,319 (100.00)
1945 27,195 0 (0.00) 27,195 (100.00)
1946 30,454 35 (0.11) 30,419 (99.89)
1947 28,963 1,584 (5.47) 27,379 (94.53)
1948 28,471 2,023 (7.11) 26,448 (92.89)
1949 27,493 2,493 (9.07) 25,000 (90.93)
1950 27,246 4,070 (14.94) 23,176 (85.06)
1951 26,703 6,815 (25.52) 19,888 (74.48)
1952 27,583 10,520 (38.14) 17,063 (61.86)
1953 27,752 15,658 (56.42) 12,094 (43.58)
1954 27,429 17,142 (62.50) 10,287 (37.50)
1955 27,805 21,403 (76.98) 6,402 (23.02)
1956 27,930 24,498 (87.71) 3,432 (12.29)
1957 27,525 26,067 (94.70) 1,458 (5.30)
1958 27,428 27,179 (99.09) 249 (0.91)
1959 27,847 27,697 (99.46) 150 (0.54)
1960 27,177 27,076 (99.63) 101 (0.37)
1961 27,378 27,378 (100.00) 0 (0.00)
1962 27,246 27,246 (100.00) 0 (0.00)
1963 27,419 27,419 (100.00) 0 (0.00)
Overall 576,512 293,303 (51.41) 280,209 (48.59)
Note: An individual is treated if the schooling reform had been implemented in the childhood municipality of
residence by the year the individual turned age 14, and non-treated otherwise.
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Figure A.1. Functional form of relationship between earnings and schooling
Note: This figure displays (i) predictions from a local linear regression of years of schooling on average annual
earnings over ages 17-62 (stippled line), (ii) prediction from a linear OLS regression of years of schooling on average
annual earnings over ages 17-62 (solid line), and (iii) the distribution of years of schooling in the full sample (area
of round circle).
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Figure A.2. Reform implementation by baseline municipality characteristics
Note: We regress an indicator of timing of school reform on baseline municipality characteristics (measured in 1960) interacted with
time dummies, controlling for municipality fixed effects (see equation (8)). The figures plot interaction terms, with coefficients
estimates standardized by subtracting the mean value and dividing by the standard deviation for each variable.
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A.2 Summary of the Norwegian tax and pension systems
As in most OECD countries, the Norwegian tax system is progressive through
deductions and surtaxes. Important features of the Norwegian tax system include a
basic flat tax rate of 28% on labor income, a series of progressively increasing surtaxes
at different income brackets, a basic income tax deduction that further increases the
progressivity, and finally, a social security contribution tax on labor income. While
the basic structure of the Norwegian tax system has remained unchanged over the
past decades, there have been considerable changes in both the surtax rates, tax
brackets, and deductions over time. Moreover, the Norwegian tax system has become
less progressive through a series of policy reforms over the recent decades. These
features provide considerable variation in both average and marginal tax rates over
time, as illustrated in Figure A.3.
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Figure A.3. Marginal and average taxes on labor income in Norway
Note: Graphs (a) and (b) plot marginal and average rates, respectively, for single wage earners. We take into
account progressivity of taxes and basic deductions for labor income. Information on tax rules is taken from SSB
(1975, 1988, 1994) and Skatteetaten (2010).
In accordance with the Norwegian National Insurance Act (Folketrygdloven), all
Norwegians are entitled to public pension upon retirement. The pension amount
depends on an individual’s earnings history from age 16 to retirement. Although the
mandatory retirement age is 67, about 80% of Norwegian workers are entitled to
receive early retirement benefits beginning at age 62 (Hernaes et al., 2013). Based on
individuals’ earnings histories, we compute their pension entitlements and after-tax
pension income. Details on the pension system can be found in AID (2009) and NAV
(2013), while tax rates on pension income are described in SSB (1975, 1988, 1994)
and Skatteetaten (2010).
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